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Abstract

ing networks, and its dataﬂow framework captures information ﬂow naturally as distributed streams computations. We further demonstrate that with the appropriate security extensions [1] to the query language used
in declarative networks, we can further allow provenance computations and queries to be authenticated in
untrusted environments.
Contributions and Organization: In Section 2, we provide a background on declarative networks, its query
languages, and recent security extensions obtained by
unifying its core language with logic-based access control languages. Next, in Section 3, we survey various use cases of network provenance ranging from realdiagnostics, forensics, accountability, and trust management. In Section 4, we then provide a taxonomy of different types of data provenance (local vs distributed, online vs ofﬂine, authenticated, etc), several of which are
derived from existing database literature, and show that
they map naturally into existing use cases. We outline
some possible optimizations (Section 5), perform initial
performance evaluations based on extensions to the P2
declarative networking system (Section 6), and then conclude in Section 7.

Network accountability and forensic analysis have become increasingly important, as a means of performing
network diagnostics, identifying malicious nodes, enforcing trust management policies, and imposing diverse
billing over the Internet. This has led to a series of work
to provide better network support for accountability, and
efﬁcient mechanisms to trace packets and information
ﬂows through the Internet. In this paper, we make the
following contributions. First, we show that network accountability and forensic analysis can be posed generally as data provenance computations and queries over
distributed streams. In particular, one can utilize declarative networks with appropriate security and provenance
extensions to provide a uniﬁed declarative framework
for specifying, analyzing and auditing networks. Second, we propose a taxonomy of data provenance along
multiple axes, and show that they map naturally to different use cases in networks. Third, we suggest techniques
to efﬁciently compute and store network provenance,
and provide an initial performance evaluation on the
P2 declarative networking system with modiﬁcations to
support authenticated communication and provenance.

1

2

Introduction

As background, we brieﬂy introduce declarative networking and its query language, including security
extensions. The high level goal of declarative networks [17, 16, 15] is to build extensible network architectures that achieve a good balance of ﬂexibility, performance and safety. Declarative networks are speciﬁed using Network Datalog (NDlog), which is a distributed recursive query language used for querying network graphs. NDlog queries are executed using a distributed query processor to implement the network protocols, and continuously maintained as distributed views
over existing network and host state. Declarative queries
such as NDlog are a natural and compact way to implement a variety of routing protocols and overlay networks. For example, traditional routing protocols can be
expressed in a few lines of code [17], and the Chord [25]
distributed hash table in 47 lines of code [16]. When
compiled and executed, these declarative networks perform efﬁciently relative to imperative implementations.

The Internet was not designed with accountability as
its primary goal. However, network accountability and
forensic analysis have become increasingly important in
recent years, as a means of performing network diagnostics, identifying malicious and misbehaving users, enforcing trust management policies, and imposing diverse
billing over the Internet. This has led to a series of proposals (e.g. [22, 3, 23, 13, 26, 4, 11, 14]) on improving
network support for accountability, and efﬁcient mechanisms to trace packets and information ﬂows through the
Internet. While there have not been a lack of proposals,
several of them narrowly tackle a speciﬁc security challenge, or target a limited set of network applications.
Provenance (also called lineage) has been studied in
many different contexts. In the context of database systems, they have primarily used in databases to help “explain” to users why a tuple exists [7]. In this paper,
we show that network accountability and forensic analysis can be posed generally as data provenance computations and queries over distributed streams. We argue that
declarative networks [15, 17, 16] enhanced with the ability to maintain provenance of computations will enable a
general extensible framework for specifying, analyzing,
and auditing networks. Declarative networks utilize a
database query language for specifying and implement-
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Declarative Networks

2.1

Network Datalog Language

NDlog is based on Datalog [19]: a Datalog program
consists of a set of declarative rules. Each rule has the
form p :- q1, q2, ..., qn., which can be read informally as “q1 and q2 and ... and qn implies p”.
Here, p is the head of the rule, and q1, q2,...,qn is a list
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of literals that constitutes the body of the rule. Literals
are either predicates with attributes (which are bound
to variables or constants by the query), or boolean expressions that involve function symbols (including arithmetic) applied to attributes. Predicates in datalog are
typically relations, although in some cases they may represent functions.
Datalog rules can refer to one another in a cyclic fashion to express recursion. The order in which the rules
are presented in a program is semantically immaterial;
likewise, the order predicates appear in a rule is not semantically meaningful. Commas are interpreted as logical conjunctions (AND). The names of predicates, function symbols, and constants begin with a lowercase letter, while variable names begin with an uppercase letter.
We illustrate NDlog using a simple example of two rules
that computes all pairs of reachable nodes:

The rules s1-s3 are within the context of the principal
S. An additional localization rewrite [15] ensures that
all rule bodies are localized within a context (i.e. have
the same location speciﬁer). Assuming an untrusted network, this allows rules to execute only based on trusted
local data, or authenticated data from remote sources.
The “says” construct is an abstraction for the details
of authentication. In one speciﬁc implementation, communication happens via signed certiﬁcates, where derived tuples signed using the private key of the exporting context can be imported into another context and
checked using the corresponding public key. E.g. node
S will import the reachable(S,Y) fact from its neighbor W, and verify that it is indeed from W via the signature stored with the fact. Node S then derives the
reachable(Z,Y) fact which is signed and exported to
node Z. Note that the implementation of “says” may depend on the system and its context. In a hostile world,
“says” may require digital signatures, while in a more
benign world, “says” may simply append a cleartext
principal header to a message—and this will of course
be cheaper. The policy writer could additionally provide
hints along with rules, indicating that some “says” are
more important than others, e.g. by supporting multiple
“says” operators with different security levels.

r1 reachable(@S,D) :- link(@S,D).
r2 reachable(@S,D) :- link(@S,Z),
reachable(@Z,D).

The rules r1 and r2 specify a distributed transitive closure computation, where rule r1 computes all pairs of
nodes reachable within a single hop from all input links
(denoted by the link), and rule r2 expresses that “if
there is a link from S to Z, and Z can reach D, then S
can reach D.” By modifying this simple example, we can
construct more complex routing protocols, such as the
distance vector and path vector routing protocols.
NDlog supports a location speciﬁer in each predicate,
expressed with @ symbol followed by an attribute. This
attribute is used to denote the source location of each
corresponding tuple. For example, all reachable and
link tuples are stored based on the @S address ﬁeld. The
output of interest is the set of all reachable(@S,D)
tuples, representing reachable pairs of nodes.
When executed, the above NDlog query is essentially
a distributed stream computation, where stream of link
and reachable tuples are joined at different nodes to
compute routing tables. In a recent work [2], we show
that sliding windows commonly used in stream processing can be used to process soft-state [20] data in declarative networks, where the time-based window size essentially corresponds to the soft-state lifetime of all routes.

2.2

S:
reachable(S,D) :- link(S,D).
linkD(D,S)@D :- link(S,D).
reachable(Z,Y)@Z :- Z says linkD(S,Z),
W says reachable(S,Y).

3

Provenance in Practice

In this section, we survey a (non-exhaustive) list of existing work in the networking literature that motivates the
use of network provenance. We classify the use-cases
as real-time diagnostics, forensics, accountability, and
trust management.
Real-time Diagnostics: Provenance is useful for realtime diagnostics and debugging [24, 8, 21] of distributed
systems. In a declarative monitoring system, one can
add additional queries that monitor a network for runtime anomalies, e.g. lack of convergence, network trafﬁc spike suggesting possible intrusion. To illustrate, a
continuous query speciﬁed in SeNDlog can be used to
compute the number of changes changes to a routing
table entry over past T seconds, and generate an alarm
event when the number of changes exceed a threshold
as an indication of possible divergence. Upon receiving
the alarm, the system may generate a distributed recursive query over the network provenance to detecting the
source of malicious activities.
Forensics: In addition to real-time data, historical data
is often required to correlate trafﬁc patterns of attackers. A common area of research has been in providing
“traceback”[22] of trafﬁc, either by the receiver or by
an involved third party, to determine where packets are

Secure Network Datalog

Secure Network Datalog (SeNDlog) [1] is a uniﬁed
declarative language for networks and security policies,
which combines language features from NDlog, and
Binder, a logic-based language for access control in distributed systems. SeNDlog utilizes Binder’s notion of
context that represents a component (or security principal) in a distributed environment and a distinguished
operator “says”. We illustrate SeNDlog via the same
reachable example as before, with the additional use of
the “says” operator:
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originated from without trusting the unauthenticated IP
headers. One can store annotations either in the packet
(i.e. piggyback each tuple with its complete “path” or
“provenance”), or maintain state at each router, to allow
for subsequent traceback via a distributed query during
forensic analysis. To reduce the storage and communication overhead, ForNet [23] and Time Machine[13] have
proposed techniques that trade-off accuracy for performance, by using summarization (via bloom ﬁlters) and
sampling techniques to compress the provenance.
Accountability: Forensics analysis is essentially a form
of call-detail used in voice telephone networks, where
historical information on the caller, callee, length of call,
and call status both in real-time and in many cases historically through the examination of call detail records.
One important use of the call-detail information is to enforce accountability, or proper usage in networks. For
example, PlanetFlow [11] is a network auditing service
provided on PlanetLab [18], to provide accountability
for all trafﬁc generated by PlanetLab services, to ensure
that all users are in accordance with PlanetLab policies.
Trust Management: In our ﬁnal use case, network
provenance is useful for enforcing distributed trust management [5] policies in networked information systems.
Using an example from Internet routing, the path-vector
protocol used in BGP carries the entire path during route
advertisement, in order to allow for ASes to enforce
their respective policies. More generally, provenance in
our system enables any networked information node to
trace the origins of its data, and hence enforce trust policies to accept or reject incoming updates based on the
source origins. The Orchestra [12] p2p data-integration
engine uses provenance in this manner, to accept or reject updates from neighboring nodes by examining the
provenance of updates and the trust relationships among
nodes. Taking this idea one step further, one can maintain a quantiﬁable notion of trust, e.g. accepting an update only if over K principals assert the update.

4

Figure 1: NDlog derivation tree for reachable(a,c).
dows for soft-state derived tuples. In order to incorporate provenance into distributed streams, we make the
following changes to traditional provenance. First, we
annotate each derivation with its location (denoted by
the location speciﬁer “@”). Second, since tuples are softstate with lifetimes, we also add creation timestamps and
time-to-live to the nodes in the tree.

4.1

Local vs Distributed Provenance

The derivation tree shown in Figure 1 can be stored either locally or in a distributed fashion. In local provenance, the tree is stored at node a, which is the ﬁnal
storage location of reachable(@a,b). In order to have
a locally complete provenance, each tuple that is derived
needs to piggy-back its entire provenance when shipped
from one node to another.
On the other hand, one can utilize distributed provenance, which only stores pointers to the previous node
to reconstruct its provenance on demand. Hence,
node a only needs to store the fact that it is derived from link(@a,b) which is available locally, and
reachable(@b,c) which is stored at node b. The analogy here is IP traceback, where one can either store the
entire traversed path within each packet (similar to local provenance), or only maintain enough state at each
router to traceback the route on demand.
There are evidently tradeoffs between local and distributed provenance. In local provenance, computation
is more expensive for each tuple, but provenance querying is cheap. Also, since each node has the provenance
available locally, it can also better enforce trust policies. On the other hand, distributed provenance requires
no extra communication overhead, but incurs expensive
cost of querying the provenance.

Taxonomy of Data Provenance

In this section, we present a taxonomy of data provenance, most of which are derived from existing database
literature. We then map that to the use cases presented in
Section 3. To illustrate, we make use of an example network which consists of three nodes a, b, c and three unidirectional links link(a,b), link(a,c), link(b,c).
We give the derivation tree for reachable(@a,c) in
Figure 1 as a result of executing the NDlog query in
Section 2.1. This derivation tree essentially represents
the lineage or provenance of the tuple, and one can use
this tree to ﬁgure out the initial input base tuples (at the
leaves of the tree). The ovals in the diagram represent
the rules (r1, r2, or union to combine their results) that
are used for the derivation of reachable(@a,c).
Declarative networks are essentially computations
over distributed streams, with time-based sliding win-

4.2

Online vs Ofﬂine Provenance

Along another axis, we can further classify provenance
as either online or ofﬂine. Online provenance is maintained for network state that is currently valid (i.e. not
expired), and ofﬂine provenance is kept even when the
derivations have expired. The purpose of online prove-
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To reduce the overhead of computing and sending
provenance, we present an existing technique to condense the size of local provenance, yet retain sufﬁcient
information for enforcing trust based on source origins. This technique is inspired by provenance semirings [9] in Orchestra [12] system, where tuples are annotated with provenance expressions that are based on the
unique keys of base input tuples. These provenance expressions can themselves be encoded in boolean expressions stored in Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) [6] ,
and further compressed as presented in [2].
To provide the intuition behind the condensation process, we revisit the derivation tree in Figure 2. Each tuple has an additional ﬁeld denoted by <...> that stores
the condensed provenance, where + represents union,
and * represents a join operation. An expression such
as <a+a*b> for reachable(a,c) can be compressed
simply into <a>. Intuitively, whether the principal b
is trusted or not is inconsequential given a. As long
as principal a is trusted by the node that receives the
reachable(a,c) tuple, this tuple will be accepted, regardless of whether principal b is trusted or not.

Figure 2: SeNDlog derivation tree for reachable(a,c) with annotations for condensed provenance.

nance is for runtime reaction to network anomalies. For
example, when a node is detected to be suspicious, one
can query the online provenance to delete all routing entries associated with the malicious node. However, online provenance by itself has limited usage given that
most networked data are maintained as soft-state with
TTLs. In this case, we can additionally maintain ofﬂine
provenance for data that has long expired. Ofﬂine provenance is also useful for real-time diagnostics, and can
additionally be used to support forensics and enforce accountability. Ofﬂine provenance can result in high storage overhead. We will revisit this issue in Section 5.

4.3

4.5

Authenticated Provenance

Up to this point, we have assumed that all nodes who
compute the provenance are trusted. In practice, authentication is required to ensure the validity of provenance
computed by other nodes (e.g. to prevent spooﬁng of
messages from malicious attackers).
Figure 2 shows an alternative derivation tree based on
the SeNDlog query presented in Section 2.2. We note
the following differences. First, since all rule bodies are
localized within the context of a security principal, we
can omit the location speciﬁers for each tuple. However, we annotate each operator (denoted by the oval)
with the location (or context) where the rule is executed.
Second, each node in the tree is asserted by a principal
using “says”. In an untrusted environment, this means
that individual nodes in the provenance tree need to have
digital signatures to validate the authenticity of the computed provenance.

4.4

Quantiﬁable Provenance

The provenance semirings formulation of provenance
also permits quantiﬁable notions of trust that can leverage the different levels of “says” described in Section 2.2. For example, consider the non-condensed
expression <a+a*b>, where principal a has security
level 2, and b has security level 1. One can conclude
that reachable(a,c) derivation has a trust level of
max(2, min(2,1))=2, assuming that the higher security level is more trusted. Other quantiﬁable notions of
trust are also possible, e.g. the count [10] of the number
of ways each derivation is achievable, or vote, representing the number of principals that agree on a derivation
concurrently.

4.6

Summary

We summarize the types of provenance that are applicable to each usage scenario. In real-time diagnostics, online provenance of existing data is required. The provenance can be local or distributed, and can further be authenticated. On the other hand, forensics and accountability require ofﬂine provenance, and in practice, would
be used in conjunction with online provenance. Trust
management is best enforced locally at each node, and
one can reduce communication overhead by using condensed provenance to store only the source principals
necessary to enforce trust, or quantiﬁable provenance if
trust is based on security levels

Condensed Provenance

When computing local provenance, the overhead of
shipping the entire provenance with each tuple may be
expensive. With authenticated provenance, the overhead
is increased due to the digital signatures. We note that
in several instances, local provenance is desired (e.g. for
deciding whether to accept a tuple based on its origins).

5

Optimizations

A key challenge in maintaining network provenance is
in lowering the storage, communication, and distributed
querying overheads. In the previous section, we have
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For the query workload, we utilize the Best-Path recursive query that computes the shortest paths between
all pairs of nodes. This query is obtained from the NDlog all-pairs reachability query presented in Section 2,
with additional predicates to compute the actual path,
cost of the path, and two extra rules for computing the
best paths. As input, we insert link tables for N nodes
with average outdegree of three, and vary the size of N
from 10 to 100. To isolate the individual overhead of
authenticated communication and provenance, we execute three versions of the Best-Path query: NDlog version without authentication and provenance, SeNDLog
with authentication but without provenance, and SeNDLogProv with both authentication and provenance. Our
metrics of evaluation are as follows:
Query completion time (s): Time taken for a query
to ﬁnish execution. As our example programs are recursive, this means the time elapsed before the system
reaches a distributed ﬁxpoint, where all nodes ﬁnish
computing their best paths.
Bandwidth usage (MB): The total combined bandwidth usage across all nodes required for executing the
distributed query.
In our experiments, we measure the computation and
bandwidth overheads of encryption and provenance by
comparing NDLog, SeNDLog and SeNDLogProv. Figure 3 and 4 shows the query completion time and bandwidth utilization respectively, averaged over 10 experimental runs. We summarize our results as follows:
SeNDlog overhead: The use of authenticated communication in SeNDLog incurs in the average 53% delay
in query completion time and additional 36% bandwidth
utilization compared to NDlog. As N increases, the additional overhead decreases. For example, when N is 100,
the overhead is 44% and 17% respectively. Given that
we are running multiple P2 processes on a single node
and generating a signature for each tuple, this represents
an upper bound on the encryption overhead.
Condensed provenance overhead: The query completion time of SeNDLogProv increases by 41% compared
to SeNDLog due to the overhead of computing and shipping provenance. In addition, SeNDLogProv requires
54% more bandwidth than SeNDLog. Similar to the
SeNDlog overhead above, we observe that provenance
overhead decreases as the number of nodes increases.
For example, when N is 100, SeNDLogProv only incurs additional 6% and 10% costs in computation and
bandwidth overhead respectively. Our results demonstrate that the BDD-encoded condensed provenance is
efﬁcient for recording derivation of tuples, at reasonably
low overhead especially for larger networks.

seen how condensed provenance encoded via BDDs can
result in a compact representation of provenance that can
be evaluated locally for trust management. In addition,
we outline three possible optimizations that we would
like to further explore as future work:
Proactive vs reactive provenance: In proactive provenance, all the provenance of new tuples are eagerly
maintained and propagated throughout the network. In
a more reactive mode of operation, one can maintain
lazy provenance, whose computation is triggered only
by speciﬁed network events. For example, in the earlier
path computation example, we can start computing the
provenance of nextHop only when route divergence is
detected. Similarly, ofﬂine provenance for forensics can
be aged out over time to reduce storage, unless explicitly
marked to persist as a result of network anomaly.
Sampling: A straightforward optimization is to only
record a portion of the provenance (both online and ofﬂine) via sampling techniques. For example, IP Traceback [22] (which generates a new message 1/20,000th of
the time) and ForNet [23] (which uses Bloom ﬁlters) are
examples of this approach. The sampling techniques can
also be applied when querying distributed provenance.
One example existing technique is the use of random
moonwalks [26] to avoid querying all provenance.
Provenance granularity: In reconstructing network
provenance, there are different granularities at which
systems can operate. To reduce overhead, provenance
can be aggregated and maintained at the AS granularity.
While it may not be conducive to detect all attacks, AS
granularity is likely sufﬁcient for detecting aggregated
events such as a large number of spoofed packet injections from a group of malicious nodes within the AS.

6

Preliminary Evaluation

In this section, we present a preliminary evaluation
study on the overhead of authenticated communication
and computation of network provenance. We modiﬁed
the P2 declarative networking system [16] to support
the SeNDlog query language, which is compiled into
distributed dataﬂows that exchange messages that are
signed with RSA signatures. We further modify various relational operators (particularly joins) in the P2
system to support provenance. In particular, we focus
on evaluating the performance of authenticated provenance (Section 4.3) which is individually signed by the
principal that asserted each fact, and we further apply
the condensation (Section 4.4) to reduce communication
and storage overhead.
We utilize the OpenSSL v0.9.8b, and Buddy BDD v2.4
libraries to support encryption and provenance. Our experiments are performed on a quad-core machine with
Intel Xeon 2.33GHz CPUs and 4GB RAM running Fedora Core 6 with kernel version 2.6.20. In our experiments, we execute up to 100 P2 processes representing
different nodes on the machine.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we argue that network accountability and
forensic analysis can be posed as data provenance com-
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putations and queries over distributed streams. In particular, one can utilize provenance-aware secure networks
with appropriate security extensions to provide a ﬂexible
declarative framework for specifying, analyzing and auditing networks. To prove our case, we propose a taxonomy of data provenance along multiple axes, and show
that they map naturally to several use cases ranging from
network forensics and diagnostics to trust management.
We suggest techniques to efﬁciently compute and store
network provenance, and provide an initial performance
evaluation using the P2 declarative networking system.
Our future work is proceeding along several fronts.
First, while we focus on forensics and accountability
over the Internet, we intend to explore the general applicability of these techniques to overlay networks and
sensor networks. Second, we are in the process of evaluating a variety of secure networks speciﬁed and implemented by using SeNDlog (e.g. secure Chord routing,
DNSSEC), and studying the usage of network provenance for a variety of networks. This will enable us to
investigate cross-layer analysis opportunities that arise
as a result of having a single integrated system that uniﬁes network and security speciﬁcations.
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